


~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION


Status of National Psychological Programs
in the Near East, South Asia,
and Africa

BASIC QUESTIONS

Extensive comments on these questions are set forth in the Division's memorandum for ADPC, entitled "Area Considerations in the Development of a National Cold War Strategy: the Near East," 7 March 1952. Largely for the sake of emphasis, the following brief comments are offered:



25X1



An actual policy conflict exists with respect to the United States policy of supporting the maintenance of France's position in North Africa, and the policy of self-determination, which affects the development of a national psychological program not only in French North Africa but throughout the African, Arab, and Asian worlds.



~~TOP SECRET~~

81697
COPIES OF 8 Copies

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

of impartiality as between the two.

2. United States capabilities have increased, and Soviet influence relatively lessened, in India over the past year, developments which have taken place largely as a result of Soviet-Communist actions and of the evolution in Indian thinking, rather than as a result of direct United States action. However, it should be noted that the same period has witnessed a decrease in United States capabilities in Iran, Egypt, and French North Africa, and, to a lesser extent, in Turkey. In Iran, and Egypt, these developments have taken place largely as a result of elements outside the control of the United States Government; in French North Africa, the United States must bear a measure of responsibility; in Turkey, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the responsibility may lie in inept handling of the Turks or in a more optimistic appraisal of our capabilities than now appears warranted.

3. On the basis of experience during the past year, our capability to combat and counter Communism in Africa, the Near East, and South Asia should be reinforced and developed. However, since the primary security problem is the growth and exercise of irresponsible nationalism in the area, we should greatly expand our efforts to utilize nationalist forces for our own purposes, by endeavoring to direct them away from their more destructive tendencies and into channels which will be relatively compatible with United States interests, namely: to endeavor to turn the force of nationalism against the Communists; to direct it against political corruption; to focus it upon demands for social reform and economic progress.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

and economic progress.

4. Major deterrents to successful prosecution of a national psychological program in the NEA area are the rise of irresponsible nationalism, accompanied by anti-Westernism, anti-colonialism, religious extremism, and xenophobia; economic instability and social unrest; racism; regional disputes, such as the Palestine and Kashmir problems; international disputes, such as the Anglo-Egyptian, Anglo-Iranian, and Franco-Tunisian controversies; and political ineptitude and irresponsibility. Our alliances with Great Britain and France also represent significant impediments to the successful conduct of our national psychological program in the area, for several reasons: first, the serious policy divergencies between the United States and Britain over Iran and Egypt and between the United States and France over French North Africa; and, second, the tendency of the Near Eastern states to identify the United States position with those of Britain and France, respectively, in connection with the controversies of the Near Eastern states with those powers.

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/07/08 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400020049-9

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/07/08 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400020049-9